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Abstract. We introduce a new approach for cryptanalysis of key agree-
ment protocols based on noncommutative groups. This approach uses
functions that estimate the distance of a group element to a given sub-
group. We test it against the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol, which is based
on Thompson’s group F , and show that it can break about half the keys
within a few seconds on a single PC.
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1 Introduction
Key agreement protocols have been the subject of extensive studies in
the past 30 years. Their main task is to allow two parties (in the sequel,
Alice and Bob) to agree on a common secret key over an insecure com-
munication channel. The best known example of such a protocol is the
Diffie-Hellman protocol, which uses a (commutative) cyclic group. Over
the last few years, there was a lot of interest in key agreement protocols
based on noncommutative groups, and much research was dedicated to
analyzing these proposals and suggesting alternative ones (see, e.g., [1,
4–8, 10–12], and references therein).
A possible approach for attacking such systems is the length-based
cryptanalysis, which was outlined in [6]. This approach relies on the exis-
tence of a good length function on the underlying group, i.e., a function
ℓ(g) that tends to grow as the number of generators multiplied to obtain
g grows. Examples of groups known to have such length functions are the
braid group BN [2] and Thompson’s group F [3]. For these groups, several
practical realizations of length-based attacks were demonstrated [4, 5, ?].
These attacks can achieve good success rates, but usually only when we
allow the algorithm to explore many suboptimal partial solutions, which
greatly increases both the time and space complexities (see [5] for more
details).
We introduce a novel approach to cryptanalysis of such key agreement
protocols, which relies on the notion of subgroup distance functions, i.e.,
functions that estimate, for an element g ∈ G and a subgroup H ≤ G,
the distance from g to H. The motivation for these distance-based at-
tacks is the fact that several families of public key agreement protocols
suggest predefined pairs of subgroups of the main group to be used for
key generation, and their security depends on the ability of the adver-
sary to generate any elements in these subgroups, which are in some
way equivalent to the originals (see [?,11]). We construct the theoretical
framework for distance-based attacks and demonstrate its applicability
using the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol in Thompson’s group F [12] as an
example. Although it has recently been shown by Matucci [8] that the
implementation of the proposed protocol in F can be broken determin-
istically using a specialized attack based on the structural properties of
the group, it is still an interesting test case for more generic attacks, such
as the one proposed here.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the protocol
in its general form. We then introduce in Section 3 the notion of subgroup
distance function and a general attack scheme based on it. Section 4
describes the setting for the protocol in Thompson’s group F . In Section 5
we introduce several subgroup distance functions in F . Section 6 describes
our experimental cryptanalytic results.
2 The Shpilrain-Ushakov Key agreement Protocol
The protocol below was suggested by Shpilrain and Ushakov in [12]. The
authors suggested to use Thompson’s group F for its implementation.
Before we focus on that example, we’ll discuss the general case.
(0) Alice and Bob agree (publicly) on a group G and subgroups A,B ≤ G,
such that ab = ba for each a ∈ A and each b ∈ B.
1. A public word z ∈ G is selected.
2. Alice selects privately at random elements a1 ∈ A and b1 ∈ B, com-
putes u1 = a1zb1, and sends u1 to Bob.
3. Bob selects privately at random elements a2 ∈ A and b2 ∈ B, com-
putes u2 = b2za2, and sends u2 to Alice.
4. Alice computes KA = a1u2b1 = a1b2za2b1, whereas Bob computes
KB = b2u1a2 = b2a1zb1a2.
As a1b2 = b2a1 and a2b1 = b1a2, KA = KB = K and so the parties
share the same group element, from which a secret key can be derived.
2.1 Breaking the protocol
The goal of the adversary is to obtain the secret group element K from
the publicly known elements u1, u2 and z. For this it suffices to solve the
following problem:
Definition 1 (Decomposition problem) Given z ∈ G and u = azb
where a ∈ A and b ∈ B, find some elements a˜ ∈ A and b˜ ∈ B, such that
a˜zb˜ = azb.
Indeed, assume that the attacker, given u1 = a1zb1, finds a˜1 ∈ A and
b˜1 ∈ B, such that a˜1zb˜1 = a1zb1. Then, because u2 = b2za2 is known, the
attacker can compute
a˜1u2b˜1 = a˜1b2za2b˜1 = b2a˜1zb˜1a2 = b2u1a2 = KB .
Alternatively, the attacker can break the protocol by finding a valid de-
composition of u2 = b2za2.
For any given a˜ ∈ A we can compute its complement b˜ = z−1a˜−1u =
z−1a˜−1(azb), which guarantees that a˜zb˜ = azb. The pair a˜, b˜ is a solution
to this problem if, and only if, b˜ ∈ B. A similar comment applies if we
start with b˜ ∈ B. This involves being able to solve the group membership
problem, i.e., to determine whether b˜ ∈ B (or a˜ ∈ A in the second case).
It should be stressed that solving the decomposition problem is suffi-
cient, but not necessary in order to cryptanalyze the system. All that is
required in practice is finding some pair a˜, b˜ that succeeds in decrypting
the information passed between Alice and Bob. Any pair a˜ ∈ A and b˜ ∈ B
will work, but there can be other pairs, which are just as good. This ob-
servation can be useful in cases where the group membership problem is
difficult or in groups where the centralizers of individual elements are con-
siderably larger than the centralizers of the subgroups (which is not the
case in F , see [9]). For simplicity, in the sequel we will restrict ourselves
to solutions where a˜ ∈ A and b˜ ∈ B.
3 Subgroup distance functions
Definition 2 (Subgroup distance function) Let G be a group, H ≤
G a subgroup. A function dH : G → R
+ is a subgroup distance function
if it satisfies the following two axioms:
1. Validity: dH(h) = 0 for all h ∈ H.
2. Non-triviality: dH(g) > 0 for all g 6∈ H.
It is an invariant subgroup distance function if it also satisfies:
(3) Invariance: dH(gh) = dH(hg) = dH(g) for all g ∈ G and h ∈ H.
Clearly, if it is possible to evaluate a subgroup distance function dH on
all elements of G, then the membership decision problem forH is solvable:
g ∈ H ⇐⇒ dH(g) = 0. Conversely, if one can solve the membership
decision problem, a trivial distance function can be derived from it, e.g.,
dH(g) = 1− χH(g), where χH is the characteristic function of H.
Obviously, this trivial distance function is not a good example. For
the subgroup distance function to be useful, it has to somehow measure
how close a given element g is to H, that is, if dH(g1) < dH(g2), then
g1 is closer to H than g2. This concept of “closeness” can be hard to
define, and even harder to evaluate. The notion of what’s considered a
good distance function may vary, depending on the subgroups and on the
presentation. In the sequel we will discuss concrete examples of subgroup
distance function in Thompson’s group F .
Assuming the existence of such functions, consider the following algo-
rithm for solving the decomposition problem:
Algorithm 1 (Subgroup distance attack)
We are given words z, xzy ∈ G, where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , X,Y are com-
muting subgroups of G and SX , SY are their respective (finite) generating
sets. The goal it to find some x˜ ∈ X and y˜ ∈ Y , such that xzy = x˜zy˜.
The algorithm runs at most a predefined number of iterations N .
1. Let x˜← 1.
2. For each gi ∈ S
±1
X compute xi = x˜gi, its complement yi = z
−1x−1i xzy
and evaluate dY (yi). If dY (yi) = 0, let x˜ = xi, y˜ = yi and halt.
3. Let j be the index of the minimum dY (yi) (if several such j are pos-
sible, choose one arbitrarily).
4. If the maximal number of iterations N has been reached, terminate.
Otherwise, let x˜← xj and return to step 2.
Observe that if the algorithm halts in step 2, then the pair x˜, y˜ is a
solution of the decomposition problem.
Algorithm 1 is very similar to the length-based attacks described in [4,
?]. The difference is that it uses the subgroup distance function, instead
of the length function to evaluate the quality of candidates. As such, any
extensions applicable to the length-based algorithms (such as memory,
lookahead, etc.) can be used with the distance-based attack as well. Refer
to [5, ?] for more information.
3.1 Attacking the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol
The adversary is given the common word z and the public elements u1, u2.
These can be translated into four equations in the group:
u1 = a1zb1
u2 = b2za2
u−1
1
= b−1
1
z−1a−1
1
u−1
2
= a−1
2
z−1b−1
2
(1)
Algorithm 1 (with or without possible extensions) can be applied to
each of the four equations separately, thus attacking each of the four
private elements a1, a2, b
−1
1
, b−1
2
. A single success out of the four attempts
is sufficient to break the cryptosystem (see Section 2.1).
4 Thompson’s group
Thompson’s group F is the infinite noncommutative group defined by the
following generators and relations:
F = 〈 x0, x1, x2, . . . | x
−1
i xkxi = xk+1 (k > i) 〉 (2)
Remark 1 From Equation (2) it’s evident that the elements x0, x1 and
their inverses generate the entire group, because x±1k = x
1−k
0
x±1
1
xk−1
0
for
every k ≥ 2.
Definition 3 A basic generator x±1i of F is called a letter. A generator
xi is a positive letter. An inverse x
−1
i is a negative letter. A word in F
is a sequence of letters. We define |w| as the length of the word w , i.e.,
the number of letters in it.
Definition 4 A word w ∈ F is said to be in normal form, if
w = xi1 · · · xirx
−1
jt
· · · x−1j1 (3)
and the following two conditions hold:
(NF1) i1 ≤ · · · ≤ ir and j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jt
(NF2) If both xi, x
−1
i occur in w, then at least one of xi+1, x
−1
i+1 occurs too.
A word is said to be in seminormal form if only (NF1) holds.
While a seminormal form is not necessarily unique, a normal form is,
i.e., two words represent the same group element if and only if they have
the same normal form [3]. The following rewriting rules can be used to
convert any word to its seminormal form [12]:
For all non-negative integers i < k:
(R1) xkxi → xixk+1
(R2) x−1k xi → xix
−1
k+1
(R3) x−1i xk → xk+1x
−1
i
(R4) x−1i x
−1
k → x
−1
k+1x
−1
i
For all non-negative integers i:
(R5) x−1i xi → 1
The seminormal form can be subsequently converted to a normal form
by searching for pairs of indices violating (NF2), starting from the bound-
ary between the positive and negative parts, and applying the inverses of
rewriting rules (R1) and (R4) to eliminate these pairs [12]:
Suppose that (xia , x
−1
jb
) is a pair of letters violating (NF2) and that
a and b are maximal with this property (i.e., there exists no violating
pair (xik , x
−1
jl
) with k > a and l > b). Then ia = jb and all indices in
xia+1 · · · xirx
−1
jt
· · · x−1jb+1 are higher than ia + 1 (by definition of (NF2)).
Applying the inverse of (R1) to xia and the inverse of (R4) to x
−1
jb
we get:
w = xi1 · · · xia (xia+1 · · · xirx
−1
jt
· · · x−1jb+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
x−1jb · · · xj1
→ xi1 · · · xia+1−1 · · · xir−1 (xiax
−1
jb
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cancel
x−1jt−1 · · · x
−1
jb+1−1
· · · xj1
→ xi1 · · · xia−1 (xia+1−1 · · · xir−1x
−1
jt−1
· · · x−1jb+1−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c′
xjb−1 · · · xj1
The violating pair (xia , x
−1
jb
) is cancelled and the subword c′ obtained
from c by index shifting contains no violating pairs (by the assumption
of maximality on (a, b)). Thus, we can continue searching for bad pairs,
starting from a− 1 and b− 1 down. Thus we are guaranteed to find and
remove all the violating pairs and reach the normal form.
Definition 5 (Normal form length) For w ∈ F , whose normal form
is wˆ, define the normal form length as ℓNF(w) = |wˆ|.
The following lemma shows the effect multiplication by a single letter
has on the normal form of the word. This result will be useful in the
following sections.
Lemma 1 Let w ∈ F and x = x±1t be a basic generator of F in the
presentation (2). Then ℓNF(xw) = ℓNF(w) ± 1 (and due to symmetry,
ℓNF(wx) = ℓNF(w) ± 1).
Proof. We’ll concentrate on the product xw (obviously, the case of wx
is similar) and observe what happens to the normal form of w when it’s
multiplied on the left by the letter x. Without loss of generality, w =
xi1 · · · xikx
−1
jl
· · · x−1j1 is in normal form. Denote the positive and negative
parts of w by wp and wn respectively.
Assume that x = xt is a positive letter. Then bw is converted to a
seminormal form by moving x into its proper location, while updating its
index, using repeated applications of (R1). Assuming m applications of
(R1) are necessary, the result is of the form:
bw = xi1 · · · ximxt+mxim+1 · · · xikx
−1
jl
· · · x−1j1 ,
where im < t+m− 1 and im+1 ≥ t+m.
Remark 2 Observe that it is not possible that im = t+m−1, because in
order to apply (R1): xt+m−1xim → ximxt+m, one must have im < t+m−1.
Example 1 w = x3x7x11x
−1
9
x−1
4
, b = x8. bw = x8 · x3x7x11x
−1
9
x−1
4
is
converted to bw = x3x7x10x11x
−1
9
x−1
4
, by 2 applications of (R1).
Obviously, bw is a seminormal form and |bw| = |w| + 1. If bw is in
normal form (as in the above example), we’re done. The only situation
where it’s not in normal form, is if it contains pairs violating (NF2).
Since xt+m is the only letter introduced, the only violating pair can be
(xt+m, x
−1
t+m). This may occur, if w contained x
−1
t+m, but neither xt+m,
nor x±1t+m+1.
Example 2 w = x3x7x11x
−1
9
x−1
4
, b = x7. bw = x7 · x3x7x11x
−1
9
x−1
4
is converted to bw = x3x7x9x11x
−1
9
x−1
4
. In this case (x9, x
−1
9
) violates
(NF2). The inverse of (R1) is applied to rewrite x9x11 → x10x9, and
x9x
−1
9
are canceled out, yielding the (normal) word b̂w = x3x7x10x
−1
4
.
Whenever a situation occurs as described above, the pair (xt+m, x
−1
t+m)
is cancelled, according to the procedure described in Section 4. This causes
all indices above t+m to be decreased by 1. The resulting word is
b̂w = xi1 · · · ximxim+1−1 · · · xik−1x
−1
jl−1
· · · x−1jn+1−1x
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 ,
where im < t+m−1, im+1 ≥ t+m+2, jn ≤ t+m and jn+1 ≥ t+m+2. We
have |b̂w| = |w| − 1 and, in fact, b̂w is in normal form. Indeed, once the
pair (xt+m, x
−1
t+m) is cancelled, the only new pair violating (NF2) that
can be introduced is (xt+m−1, x
−1
t+m−1), but this is not possible, because
xt+m−1 does not appear in b̂w, due to Remark 2. This completes the proof
for positive letters.
Now, consider the case where x = x−1t , a negative letter. bw is con-
verted to a seminormal form by moving x−1t to the right, while updating
its index, using the different rewriting rules. There are two possible out-
comes:
(1) After m applications of (R2) the resulting word is
bw = xi1 · · · ximx
−1
t+mxim+1 · · · xikx
−1
jl
· · · x−1j1 ,
where im+1 = t+m, and so the pair is cancelled by applying (R5). Now,
because im < t+m− 1, the elimination of the pair (xt+m, x
−1
t+m) does not
introduce pairs that violate (NF2), and so bw is in normal form and has
|bw| = |w| − 1.
Example 3 w = x3x7x
−1
9
x−1
4
, b = x−1
6
. bw = x−16 x3x7x
−1
9
x−1
4
is con-
verted to x3x
−1
7 x7x
−1
9
and the pair of inverses is cancelled out to obtain
x−1
4
→ x3x
−1
9
x−1
4
.
(2) x−1t is moved to its proper place among the negative letters, up-
dating its index if necessary. This is completed through m applications of
(R2), followed by k−m applications of (R3) and finally, l−n applications
of (R4), to obtain
bw = xi1 · · · ximx
−1
t+mxim+1+1 · · · xik+1x
−1
jl+1
· · · x−1jn+1+1x
−1
t+mx
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 ,
where im < t+m−1, im+1 > t+m, jn+1 > t+m and jn ≤ t+m. Because
the letter xt+m is not present in bw (otherwise the previously described
situation would occur), the newly introduced letter x−1t+m cannot violate
(NF2), and therefore bw is in fact in normal form and |bw| = |w|+ 1.
Example 4 w = x3x7x
−1
9
x−1
4
, b = x−1
5
. bw = x−15 x3x7x
−1
9
x−1
4
is rewrit-
ten as: x−16 x7x
−1
9
x−1
4
→ x3x8x
−1
6 x
−1
9
x−1
4
→ x3x8x
−1
10
x
−1
6 x
−1
4
.
This completes the proof for negative letters.
⊓⊔
4.1 The Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol in Thompson’s group
For a natural number s ≥ 2 let SA = {x0x
−1
1
, . . . , x0x
−1
s }, SB = {xs+1, . . . ,
x2s} and SW = {x0, . . . , xs+2}. SW generates F (see Remark 1). Denote
by As and Bs the subgroups of F generated by SA and SB, respectively.
All of the following facts are shown in [12]: As is exactly the set of
elements whose normal form is
xi1 · · · ximx
−1
jm
· · · x−1j1 ,
i.e, has positive and negative parts of the same length m, and additionally
satisfies ik − k < s and jk − k < s for every k = 1, . . . ,m. Bs is the set of
all elements of F whose normal form consists only of letters with indices
≥ s + 1. Additionally, As and Bs commute elementwise, which makes
them usable for implementing the protocol in Section 2.
Key generation Let s ≥ 2 and L be positive integers. The words a1, a2 ∈
As, b1, b2 ∈ Bs, and w ∈ F are all chosen of normal form length L, as
follows: Let X be A, B, or W . Start with the empty word, and multiply
it on the right by a generator (or inverse) selected uniformly at random
from the set SX . Continue this procedure until the normal form of the
word has length L.
For practical and (hopefully) secure implementation of the protocol,
it is suggested in [12] to use s ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 8} and L ∈ {256, 258, . . . , 320}.
5 Subgroup distance functions in Thompson’s group
In this section we’ll suggest several natural distance functions from the
subgroups As, Bs ≤ F defined in Section 4.1. These distance functions
can be used to implement the attack outlined by Algorithm 1.
5.1 Distance functions from Bs
For w ∈ F define Pi(w) and Ni(w) as the number of occurrences of xi
and x−1i in the normal form wˆ of w.
Definition 6 (Distance from Bs) Let s ≤ 2 be an integer. For w ∈ F
the distance from Bs is defined as
dBs(w) =
s∑
i=0
(Pi(w) +Ni(w))
Claim 1 dBs is a distance function.
Proof. This is immediate, since an element is in Bs if and only if its
normal form does not contain generators with indices below s + 1 (see
Section 4.1). ⊓⊔
Claim 2 dBs is an invariant distance function.
Proof. It is enough to consider only the generators of Bs. Indeed, if mul-
tiplication by a single generator of Bs does not change the distance of a
word w, neither does multiplication by a sequence of these generators.
Let w ∈ F . Let b = x±1s+α, where α > 0. By Lemma 1, we know
that b is either moved to its proper position (and ℓNF(bw) = ℓNF(w) + 1)
or it is cancelled with its inverse, either by (R5) or as part of a pair
violating (NF2), in which case ℓNF(bw) = ℓNF(w) − 1. The index of b
is initially above s, and may only increase when the rewriting rules are
applied. Therefore, if b is cancelled at some point, the index of its inverse
is also above s. Furthermore, when pairs of elements are rewritten, the
lower-indexed element is not affected, so any letters with indices ≤ s will
not be affected by moving b. Finally, if b is cancelled out due to violating
(NF2), the process again only affects letters with indices higher than b’s
(see the proof of Lemma 1). In all cases, the generators with indices ≤ s
are not affected at all, and so dBs(bw) = dBs(w).
⊓⊔
One can intuitively feel that dBs is a natural distance function, because
it counts the number of “bad” letters in w (letters that do not belong to
the subgroup Bs). Indeed, if w is in normal form, w = wpwcwn, where wp
and wn are the “bad” positive and negative subwords, respectively, then
dBs(w) = |wp|+ |wn| and w
−1
p ww
−1
n ∈ B.
We now introduce another natural function that measures distance
from Bs.
Definition 7 (Weighted distance from Bs) Let s ≤ 2 be an integer.
For w ∈ F the weighted distance from Bs is defined as
dBs(w) =
s∑
i=0
(s+ 1− i) (Pi(wˆ) +Ni(wˆ))
dBs does not only count the “bad” letters, but assigns a score for each
letter, depending on how far below s + 1 it is (in particular, dBs(w) ≤
dBs(w) for all w ∈ F . The following claim is straightforward.
Claim 3 dBs is an invariant distance function.
Proof. The proof of Claim 2 shows that multiplication by b does not alter
any letters below s + 1 in w. Therefore, the weight of each such letter is
also preserved. ⊓⊔
5.2 Distance functions from As
We will now describe a number of natural distance functions from the
subgroup As. Recall (Section 4.1) that As is the set of all elements in F ,
whose normal form is of the type xi1 · · · ximx
−1
jm
· · · x−1j1 , i.e, has positive
and negative parts of the same lengthm, and additionally satisfies ik−k <
s and jk − k < s for every k = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 8 (Distance from As) Let s ≥ 2 be an integer. Let w ∈ F ,
such that its normal form is wˆ = xi1 · · · xipx
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 . The distance from
As is defined as
dAs(w) = |{k : ik − k ≥ s}| + |{l : jl − l ≥ s}| + |p− n|
dAs(w) is the number of “bad” letters in wˆ, i.e., letters that violate
the As property, plus the difference between the lengths of the positive
or negative parts. dAs is clearly a distance function. However, it is not
invariant, as shown by the following example:
Similarly we can define a weighted distance function from As, which
not only counts the number of bad letters, but gives a score to each such
letter, based on the difference ik − k (or jk − k).
Definition 9 (Weighted distance from As) Let s ≥ 2 be an integer.
Let w ∈ F , such that its normal form is wˆ = xi1 · · · xipx
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 . The
weighted distance from As is defined as
dAs(w) =
ik−k≥s∑
k=1...p
(ik − k − s+ 1) +
jk−k≥s∑
k=1...n
(jk − k − s+ 1) + |p− n|
For each bad letter xik or x
−1
jk
, dAs adds a positive integer. As such,
it’s a distance function, which is again not invariant (the example above
works here too).
A somewhat different approach to defining distance from As arises
from the observation that the number of bad letters can be less important
than the maximum value of the differences ik − k and jk − k across the
word, which measures the size of the violation. The difference between
the two distance functions roughly corresponds to the difference between
the L1 and L∞ norms.
Let wˆ = xi1 · · · xipx
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 . Suppose that for some integer k we
have ik − k − s + 1 = mp > 0 and that mp is the maximum for all ik.
By multiplying the word by x
mp
0
we shift the position for all the original
positive letters of w by mp, and so all of the positive letters, including the
first m x0’s have ik − k < s. Similarly, if mn is the maximum violation in
the negative subword, multiplication by x−mn
0
on the right eliminates all
violations among negative letters. However, this still does not mean that
the word is in As, because the positive and negative lengths may differ. Let
wˆ′ be the normal form obtained from wˆ through multiplication by x
mp
0
and
x−mn
0
on the left and right, respectively. Let lp and ln be the corresponding
lengths of the positive and negative parts of wˆ′. If lp − ln > 0, then
wˆ′x
ln−lp
0
∈ As. If lp−ln < 0, then x
ln−lp
0
wˆ′ ∈ As. Altogether, any word can
be changed to a word in As through multiplication by mp+mn+ |lp+ ln|
indices (when lp and ln are evaluated after multiplying by x
mp
0
and x−mn
0
).
This observation suggests the following distance function:
Definition 10 (Maximum-based distance from As) Let s ≥ 2 be
an integer. Let w ∈ F , such that its normal form is wˆ = xi1 · · · xip
x−1jn · · · x
−1
j1
. Let
mp = max ({0} ∪ {ik − k − s+ 1 : k = 1 . . . p})
and
mn = max ({0} ∪ {jk − k − s+ 1 : k = 1 . . . n}) .
The maximum-based distance from As is defined as
dmAs(w) = mp +mn + |(p+mp)− (n+mn)|
For every w ∈ As mp, mn and |p − n| are 0 by definition, while for
every w 6∈ As at least one of them has to be positive, so the d
m
As
is a
distance function. It turns out that, unlike the two previously defined
distance functions, dmAs is also invariant.
Claim 4 dmAs is an invariant distance function.
Proof. As with Claim 2, it’s sufficient to prove that multiplication by a
single generator of As does not change the distance from any word w to
As. We will consider multiplications on the left by generators and their
inverses. The multiplication on the right follows symmetrically.
Let w = xi1 · · · xipx
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 , without loss of generality, in normal
form. Consider the generator x0x
−1
t , where 1 ≤ t ≤ s. Define w
′ as the
normal form of x0x
−1
t w. For the parameters p, n,mp,mn of w, denote by
p′, n′,m′p,m
′
n their corresponding values in w
′.
From Lemma 1 it follows that each of the letters x−1t and x0 can either
be cancelled out with the appropriate inverse, decreasing the length by 1,
or placed in its appropriate location, increasing the length by 1. There is
a total of 4 possible options:
(1) x−1t is cancelled out, but x0 is not: w
′ = x0xi1 · · · ximxim+2 · · ·
xipx
−1
jn
· · · x−1j1 , where x
−1
t+m is cancelled out with xim+1 afterm applications
of (R2). It follows that p′ = p, n′ = n and m′n = mn (because the negative
letters are unaffected). Observe also that there can be no bad letters among
the first m: indeed, (R2) is applied m times, for each k = 1 . . . m rewriting
x−1t+k−1xik → xikx
−1
t+k, so necessarily ik < t+k−1 for all k, or equivalently,
ik − k < t − 1 < s. The multiplication by x0 on the left only increases
their relative positions, thus decreasing ik − k. Now, any possible bad
letters above im are unchanged, and neither is their relative position, so
m′p = mp and overall d
m
As
(w′) = dmAs(w).
(2) Both x−1t and x0 are cancelled out: w
′ = xi1−1 · · · xim−1xim+2−1 · · ·
xip−1x
−1
jn−1
· · · x−1jq+1−1x
1−q
0
. Here p′ = p − 1, n′ = n − 1 and m′n = mn
because all negative letters x−1jk with jk > 0 had both their indices and
their relative positions decreased by 1. The same thing applies to positive
letters above im, which are the only positive letters that may be bad. So
again, m′p = mp and d
m
As
(w′) = dmAs(w).
(3) Neither x−1t , nor x0 are cancelled out: w
′ = x0xi1 · · · ximxim+1+1 · · ·
xip+1x
−1
jn+1
· · · x−1jq+1+1x
−1
t+mx
−1
jq
· · · x−1j1 . Here p
′ = p + 1 and n′ = n + 1.
Due to the former observation, bad positive letters may only exist beyond
the first m. All these letters had their indices ik and their relative po-
sitions k increased by 1, so the difference is preserved and m′p = mp.
Among the negative letters, only the letters whose indices increased, also
had their relative position increased, so jk−k is preserved for all the orig-
inal letters of w. Hence, m′n ≥ mn and the only situation when it may
actually increase is when the new maximum is attained at the new letter,
i.e., m′n = (t +m) − (q + 1) − s + 1 > mn. Because t ≤ s, m ≤ p and
q ≤ n, we have m′n ≤ p− q, from which it follows that
(p′+m′p)−(n
′+m′n) = (p
′−n′)+(m′p−m
′
n) = (p+1)−(n+1)+mp−m
′
n ≥
≥ mp + (p− n)− (p− q) = mp + q − n ≥ 0
Assuming m′n > mn, it’s obvious that
(p− n) + (mp −mn) > (p
′ − n′) + (m′p −m
′
n) ≥ 0 ,
and so ifmn increases, |(p+mp)− (n+mn)| decreases by the same amount,
and overall dmAs(w
′) = dmAs(w).
(4) x−1t is not cancelled out, but x0 is: w
′ = xi1−1 · · · xim−1xim+1 · · ·
xipx
−1
jn
· · · x−1jq+1x
−1
t+m−1x
−1
jq−1
· · · x−1jr+1−1x
1−r
0
, where p′ = p, n′ = n, m′p =
mp (because the first m positive letters, whose indices have changed, con-
tained no bad letters), and m′n again may only increase, if it’s attained
at x−1t+m−1. Repeating the same calculations shows that d
m
As
(w′) = dmAs(w)
in this case too.
Now consider the inverse xtx
−1
0
and denote w′ = xtx
−1
0
w. The four
possible outcomes are:
(1) x−1
0
is cancelled out, but xt is not: x
−1
0
can only be cancelled out if
i1 = 0, and the resulting word is: w
′ = xi2 · · · ximxt+m−1xim+1 · · · xipx
−1
jn
· · ·
x−1j1 . Here p
′ = p, n′ = n, m′n = mn (negative part is not affected) and
m′p = mp because the letters xi2 to xim cannot be bad and the relative
position of other positive letters has not changed.
(2) Both x−1
0
and xt are cancelled out: Assuming xt is cancelled out
(due to violation of (NF2)) with x−1jq , w
′ = xi2 · · · ximxim+1−1 · · · xip−1
x−1jn−1 · · · x
−1
jq+1−1
x−1jq−1 · · · x
−1
j1
. Here p′ = p − 1, n′ = n − 1, m′p = mp,
because xi2 to xim cannot be bad and the relative position of other positive
letters has not changed, and m′n = mn, because the letters whose positions
shifted also had their indices decreased.
(3) Neither x−1
0
, nor xt are cancelled out. w
′ = xi1+2 · · · xim+2xt+m
xim+1+1 · · · xip+1x
−1
jn+1
· · · x−1jq+1x
−q
0 . Here p
′ = p+1, n′ = n+1, m′p = mp,
because indices above im grew by 1, as did their positions, and indices
i1, . . . , im cannot be bad, and also m
′
n = mn, because all letters whose
indices increased (jq and above) shifted in position accordingly.
(4) x−1
0
is not cancelled out, but xt is: w
′ = xi1+2 · · · xim+2xim+1 · · · xip
x−1jn · · · x
−1
jq+1
x−1jq−1+1 · · · x
−1
jr+1
x
−r
0 , the cancelled pair being (xt+m, x
−1
jq
), where
jq = t + m. In this case, any positive letters that can be bad kept their
indices and positions, the negative letters jr+1, . . . , jq−1 had their indices
and positions shifted, while the letters jq+1, . . . , jn kept their indices and
positions. So m′p = mp and m
′
n = mn and obviously p
′ = p and n′ = n.
We see that in all the possible cases, dmAs(w
′) = dmAs(w). This completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
6 Experimental results
To test the applicability of the subgroup distance functions to cryptanal-
ysis, we tested Algorithm 1 against the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol in the
settings of Thompson’s group. Initially, each of the five distance functions
presented in the previous section was tested separately: we generated a
public element azb and tried to recover a single private element a or b
from it. For the recovery of a, the functions dBs and dBs were used to
assess the quality of the complements. Similarly, for the recovery of b, we
tried dAs , dAs and d
m
As
.
For each distance function, the experiment was run at least 1000 times,
each time with new, randomly generated keys, with the minimum recom-
mended parameters of s = 3, L = 256. The bound N = 2L was chosen
on the number of iterations, since preliminary experiments have shown
that the success rates do not increase beyond that. The results are sum-
marized in Table 1. It can be seen that the distance functions dBs and
dmAs noticeably outperform the other distance functions, in recovering a
and b, respectively. The fact that dmAs clearly outperforms its counter-
parts suggests that the notion of invariance may be useful for assessing
the suitability of a given distance function.
Table 1. Success rates for the different subgroup distance functions
dBs dBs dAs dAs d
m
As
Recovery probability 11.7% 3.4% 3.7% 3.4% 23.3%
Preliminary experiments have shown that, regardless of the settings,
the success probability of finding a1 given a1zb1 is similar to that of finding
a−1
2
given a−1
2
z−1b−1
2
. A similar assertion holds for b2 and b
−1
1
. Therefore,
in order to estimate the overall success rate against an actual instance of
the cryptosystem, it’s sufficient to try to recover one of the four a’s and
b’s. If we denote by pa and pb the probability of successfully recovering
a and b, respectively, and assume that all probabilities are independent,
then, the expected total success rate is roughly 1 − (1 − pa)
2(1 − pb)
2
(because each instance of the protocol contains two elements of type a
and two of type b).
When the success rates of the two best distance functions, dBs for a
and dmAs for b, are combined, the expected overall success probability, ac-
cording to the above, is between 50% and 54%, which was experimentally
verified. Note that this attack is very efficient, since it involves no back-
tracking, no lookahead, and no analysis of suboptimal partial results: it
tries to peel off the generators by a greedy algorithm, which considers only
locally optimal steps. Attacking each key required only a few seconds on
a single PC, and it is very surprising that such a simple attack succeeds
about half the time. These results are much better than those achieved
by length-based attacks of similar complexity on this cryptosystem (see
[9]).
It is interesting to note that possible extensions of the attack, such as
memorizing many suboptimal partial solutions or using significant looka-
head (which require much higher time and space complexities) have dif-
ferent effects on length-based and distance-based attacks. While it was
shown in [9] that these extensions greatly improve the success rates of
the length-based attack, experiments with the distance-based attack, with
similar values of the memory and lookahead parameters, showed almost
no improvement. However, the situation may be very different for other
cryptosystems and other subgroup distance functions.
To further test the performance of the distance functions, several ex-
periments were run with different values of the parameters (s, L). We
used the combination of dBs and d
m
As
, which was established as the best
in the former experiment. Table 2 shows the overall success probabil-
ity, for L ∈ {128, 256, 320, 512, 640, 960} and s ∈ {3, 5, 8}. The success
rates stay remarkably consistent across different lengths for a given s,
and even increasing s does not cause a significant drop. The time com-
plexity of the attack grows linearly with s and roughly quadratically with
L, with most of the time being spent on computing normal forms of ele-
ments in the group. For the largest parameters presented here, the attack
still required under a minute in most cases. This suggests that for the
Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosystem the distance-based attack remains a vi-
able threat, even when the security parameters s and L are increased
beyond the original recommendations.
Table 2. Success rates for different combinations of (s,L)
L = 128 L = 256 L = 320 L = 512 L = 640 L = 960
s = 3 51.7% 47.9% 55.5% 51.2% 50.4% 52.6%
s = 5 46.0% 47.1% 48.4% 51.1% 48.2% 48.3%
s = 8 36.2% 42.8% 41.3% 46.5% 42.4% 50.3%
7 Conclusion
We introduced a novel form of heuristic attacks on public key cryptosys-
tems that are based on combinatorial group theory, using functions that
estimate the distance of group elements to a given subgroup. Our results
demonstrate that these distance-based attacks can achieve significantly
better success rates than previously suggested length-based attacks of
similar complexity, and thus they are a potential threat to any cryp-
tosystem based on equations in a noncommutative group, which takes
its elements from specific subgroups. It will be interesting to test this
approach for other groups and other protocols.
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